Abstract: Analysis of incidence and impact trends mined from recent computer crime survey data has yielded circumstantial evidence in support of the previously proposed concept of the 'inverse CSI effect', operating in the cyber-crime domain. The implications of this finding for digital forensics and e-crime investigations are discussed.
Introduction and background
The 'CSI effect' has been well documented in recent years. In essence, as a result of viewing the extremely popular television series Crime Scene Investigation (CSI aka CSI Las Vegas) and its two spin-offs CSI Miami and CSI New York, jurors not possessing a technical background have come to expect unambiguous results from forensic tests to be provided by forensic scientists almost instantaneously and in virtually all circumstances. These unrealistic expectations, fuelled by the need for dramatic licence within the entertainment media, have inevitably resulted in disappointment and incomprehension when confronted by the contingent, probabilistic and often time-consuming nature of actual forensic examinations.
The pilot for the CSI Las Vegas series was screened on the CBS network in the USA during 2000 with CSI Miami piloting in 2002 and CSI New York following in 2004. The use of the term 'CSI effect' can be traced back in print to at least October 2002 (Kluger, 2002) . However, Norman Fenton has recently reported that in a private conversation in July 2011 Lord Justice Leveson claimed to have coined the term (Fenton, 2011) .
Empirical academic studies of jurors have been undertaken to determine whether or not the CSI effect does in fact exist (for example, Shelton et al., 2006; Turner, 2011) , while alternative approaches based on programme content analysis and conviction rate statistics have also been reported (Podlas, 2005; Schweitzer and Saks, 2007) . The overall consensus of these studies is somewhat equivocal.
At a recent workshop (Overill, 2011) , we proposed the hypothesis of the 'inverse CSI effect' which examines how an actual or potential criminal might be expected to react to the CSI effect in terms of modifying their behaviour, or modus operandi (MO). In particular, we considered how the inverse CSI effect might be expected to operate within the digital forensics paradigm. This examination gave rise to a number of predictions regarding current and future trends in the behavioural profiles of cybercriminals.
If the proposed inverse CSI effect were indeed operative in the cyber domain, causing a proportion of cyber-criminals to believe that unambiguous digital forensic evidence of their nefarious activities could be routinely and reliably obtained almost instantaneously, they would be likely to modify their MO in one of a number of alternative ways. Firstly, they might elect to withdraw altogether from cyber-criminal activity that now appears too risky in the light of the perceived ease of discovery and apprehension. Secondly, they might opt to go 'under the radar' by restricting their activities to those whose anticipated impacts lie below the operational (technical or economic) detection threshold. In this context, a technical detection threshold is one below which any potentially nefarious activity cannot be reliably distinguished from the 'noise' produced by natural variability during normal operation. An economic detection threshold, on the other hand, is one below which potentially nefarious activity may be reliably detectable but it is nevertheless not a cost-effective course of action to perform a forensic investigation. Note that both of the strategies outlined above would cause the activities of these two groups of cyber-criminals to disappear from the statistics.
A third strategy for cyber-criminals to adopt would be to migrate to alternative modalities involving many layers of concealment, stealth and obfuscation in order to avoid detection by the 'super cyber-sleuths' (as seen on TV). This strategy can essentially be characterised as 'raising the bar', but it also involves substantial resource implications. These include new skill sets that have to be acquired either by learning (which takes time and effort) or by hiring (which costs money). The up-front and ongoing investment costs required to implement and maintain the advanced methodologies and techniques associated with the concealment, stealth and obfuscation strategies will necessitate a proportionate increase in the expected returns, in order to maintain a stable cost-benefit ratio for the cyber-criminals' enterprise. Thus we would anticipate seeing a compensating increase in the average value of cyber-crime heists by this group of cyber-criminals, accompanied by a migration towards more sophisticated anti-detection strategies.
In summary, if the proposed inverse CSI effect were in fact operative within the cyber domain then, in the absence of other competing processes, it should manifest itself through the following three trends:
• a reduction in the incidence (frequency) of economic cyber-crimes over time
• an increase in the impact (value) of economic cyber-crimes over time
• an enhanced use of anti-forensic techniques by cyber-criminals over time.
Evidence base and methodology
The evidence base within which the first two trends listed above might be detected are the computer crime surveys which are regularly carried out by various organisations including the Computer Security Institute (CSI, 1997 (CSI, , 1998 (CSI, , 1999 (CSI, , 2000 (CSI, , 2001 (CSI, , 2002 (CSI, , 2003 (CSI, , 2004 (CSI, , 2005 (CSI, , 2006 (CSI, , 2007 (CSI, , 2008 (CSI, , 2009 (CSI, , 2010 , the Ponemon Institute , 2006 , 2007 , 2008 , 2009 , PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC, 2001 , 2003 , 2007 , 2009 , the UK DTI-PwC (NCC, 1992; NCC/DTI/ICL, 1994; NCC/DTI/ICL/ITSEC, 1996; NCC/DTI/ITSEC, 1998; PwC/DTI, 2000 , 2002 , 2004 , 2006 PwC/BERR, 2008; PwC/BIS, 2010 ), and CyberSource (2000 . Of these, the longest running annual series of surveys with the most consistent retention over time of both survey methodology and category definitions is the US-based CSI survey.
We have drawn the data for the present analysis from the CSI surveys of 2005 onwards, in order to cover entire the period of time during which all three CSI series were being aired on a weekly basis. Another reason for excluding data prior to 2005 is the enactment in most US states of information security and data breach notification laws from 2002. Organisations would be unlikely to risk reporting any un-notified incidents to the survey for fear of possible legal repercussions, and this reducing effect could mask any increasing trend due to the inverse CSI effect. As with all survey data, the usual caveats concerning self-selection and consequent sampling bias must be borne in mind. The average financial loss data over this period have been corrected for US$ inflation so that all financial data refers to 2010 US$ values and any observed trends are unrelated to inflation. In addition, because the CSI annual surveys up to and including 2008 refer to calendar years, while those for 2009 onwards run from the previous mid-year until the named mid-year, we have employed a two-year moving average trend to smooth out the resulting irregularities in the average financial loss data. The raw CSI survey data and derived data used in our analysis are set out in Table 1 . 
Results and discussion
Figures 1 and 2 refer respectively to trends 1 and 2 listed at the end of Section 1. Figure 1 shows a marked monotonic decrease in the percentage of survey respondents experiencing quantifiable financial impacts from cyber-crimes between January 2005 and June 2010, which provides circumstantial support for trend 1. Figure 2 shows the data points for the annual average financial losses reported between January 2005 and June 2010, together with the two-year moving average trend line. It will be noted that, unlike the incidence data in Figure 1 , the impact data in Figure 2 is not completely monotonic over time; however the trend line reveals an upward trend in average financial impact over the five-and-a-half-years' time-frame. Note also that the trends shown in Figures 1  and 2 are essentially 'mirror inverses' of each another: the rate of decrease of incidence is initially rapid but reduces with time while the rate of increase of impact is initially slow but increases with time. As regards trend 3, the main supporting evidence is to be found within reports of law enforcement e-crime units which frequently state that the level of technical sophistication encountered by their digital forensic investigators is continually increasing (for example, ACPO e-Crime Strategy Report, 2009). The inverse CSI effect can also be regarded as a 'forcing effect' driving up the level of anti-forensic technology employed by cyber-criminals in an effort to 'stay ahead of the curve'. While we believe that this constitutes the first systematic formulation and empirical investigation of the inverse CSI effect, we have noted an anecdotal reference to US criminals being observed attempting to self-educate by closely watching CSI whilst in prison (Mirsky, 2005) ; this has been termed the 'police chief's effect' (Cole and Dioso-Villa, 2009 ). While this is not in and of itself particularly surprising, given that at its peak the combined viewing figures for the three CSI series was estimated to exceed 60 million (Heinrick, 2006) , it nevertheless offers some empirical support for the plausibility of the inverse CSI effect as an hypothesis. Although the CSI series are of US origin and we have used US CSI survey data as our evidence base, we do not believe that the putative inverse CSI effect is peculiar to the USA or to CSI. It seems probable that wherever a TV series similar to CSI is aired and becomes popular there is a reasonable likelihood that a CSI effect and a corresponding inverse CSI effect will emerge. This last observation would apply to TV series such as Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS, http://www.cbs.com/shows/ncis/) in the USA and Spooks (http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b006mf4b) in the UK, amongst others.
Non-corporate e-crimes
It has recently been suggested (Weir, 2012) that an alternative explanation for the trends observed above could be that cyber criminals have shifted their attention towards the individual and away from the corporate sector. Since the CSI data refer exclusively to organisational e-crimes, this alternative explanation cannot immediately be ruled out and in order to explore it further it is necessary to analyse a source of e-crime data which focuses on individuals. The Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3, http://www.ic3.gov/ media/annualreports.aspx) is a US Government supported organisation which produces annual statistics of e-crimes reported by the general public, predominantly in the USA. As with all e-crime reporting and surveys, the IC3 data will be subject to some degree of sampling bias due to the effects of self-selection and a fluctuating population of respondents over time. Furthermore, there appear to be no directly comparable US sources for individual e-crimes against which to calibrate the IC3 data. However, in order to gain some insight into the incidence and impact of e-crimes targeted at the individual in the USA, we have performed a similar analysis on the IC3 data as on the CSI data. The numerical results of the IC3 analysis are presented in Table 2 and displayed graphically in Figures 3 and 4 . The incidence and impact trends in Figures 3 and 4 respectively refer only to that fraction of e-crimes reported to IC3 by respondents from within the USA. The impact trend data in Figure 4 has been corrected for US dollar inflation using 2010 as the baseline, in order to make it directly comparable with the CSI impact trend line in Figure 2 . It should be noted that in 2010 IC3 exceptionally did not report financial loss data. Furthermore, in 2005 IC3 additionally reported a total of 83,151 fraudulent referrals involving an average loss of $2,202. This data, after adjustment for US residency and dollar inflation respectively, could replace the 2005 data points in Figures 3 and 4 respectively; however, the effects on the respective trends are at best marginal. The principal observation concerning Figure 3 is that the proportion of e-crimes reported by individuals that specify a financial loss has remained reasonably constant over the period 2005-2011 at around 40%. The reason for the dip in the proportion of incidents involving loss to 26.5% in 2008 is not entirely clear; the IC3 report for 2008 does attempt to explain it, and it may simply be the result of a coincidental 30% increase in all reports and a 19% de-crease in reports involving financial loss during that year. In any case, the IC3 data offers no support for the alternative hypothesis that cyber criminals in the USA are turning their attention to e-crimes targeting individuals, in preference to organisations. This is most likely due to the fact that one of the effects of the global media in reporting news stories such as the extradition and/or prosecution of cyber criminals (for example, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-18722053), and in providing Malware alerts or password advice (such as [http://www.metro.co.uk/news/newsfocus/9 04863-password-passw0rd-and-123456-why-we-need-to-alter-our-passwords) is to make individual users more security conscious and hence more difficult to subvert or defraud online. A further observation concerning Figure 4 is that the growth in impact (average financial loss) over time is strictly monotonic and slowly varying for e-crimes targeted at individuals, in comparison to those targeting organisations (Figure 2 ). This suggests that many cyber-criminals are prepared to play for high stakes by challenging an organisation's security portfolio, rather than gradually accumulating small winnings from many individuals.
Conclusions and further work
We venture to suggest that Figures 1 and 2 taken together offer circumstantial evidence for the operation of an inverse CSI effect within the US cyber-crime domain. By its very nature this empirical evidence can only ever be circumstantial since it is always possible that alternative explanations could be invoked which would produce similar statistical trends and would thus be phenomenologically indistinguishable from the inverse CSI effect. Examples might include improved public awareness of cyber-security issues and the availability of software with improved security, both of which would mirror trend 1, but not necessarily trends 2 and 3. An alternative explanation for all three trends might be control of the cyber-crime sector by serious organised cybercrime, wishing to eliminate all competition from the sector. However, such sectoral domination is much less easy to achieve in cyberspace than in real-world enterprises. The inverse CSI effect thus remains at least a plausible explanation that embraces all of the empirically observed trends.
It has also recently been suggested (Wall, 2012 ) that popular films with a prominent cyber forensics element in the plot line, such as War Games (1983) , Sneakers (1992) , Hackers (1995) and Antitrust (2001) , might exhibit a similar form of 'inverse CSI effect'. While films, unlike TV series, would not produce a cumulative temporal 'inverse CSI effect', they should nevertheless contribute to lower-level 'background' awareness in the cyber-criminal community. This suggests that a criminological research study which includes a survey of currently imprisoned cyber-criminals to determine their TV series and film viewing habits both prior to arrest and during imprisonment would be well motivated.
